Operation Lightfoot: Difference between revisions
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At Dropzone Bravo, the 4th parachute Battalion quickly had to regroup and attack the Capetians, who by now had pulled almost a full infantry battalion onto the ridgelines and bluffs overlooking the River Merve. These high features could serve to assist in the coordination of artillery and air support against any Arco forces attempting to cross the rivers and push deeper inland, and as such the critical piece of terrain had to be captured early in the invasion. the 4th Parachute Battalion (Juliet, Kilo, Lima Companies) engaged in a multi-combat team attack in an attempt to seize, or at least fix, the enemy entrenched there. Despite the 1.5:1 numerical superiority held by the Cape, the ridgeline was hammered by Arco aerial strikes as well as 81mm and 120mm mortars almost constantly. The 3rd Airborne Field Battery in its After-Action Report (AAR) reported that it had used almost 50% of its first-wave dropped ammunition stores on defensive positions on or supporting Hill 334 in the first 24 hours of fighting. | At Dropzone Bravo, the 4th parachute Battalion quickly had to regroup and attack the Capetians, who by now had pulled almost a full infantry battalion onto the ridgelines and bluffs overlooking the River Merve. These high features could serve to assist in the coordination of artillery and air support against any Arco forces attempting to cross the rivers and push deeper inland, and as such the critical piece of terrain had to be captured early in the invasion. the 4th Parachute Battalion (Juliet, Kilo, Lima Companies) engaged in a multi-combat team attack in an attempt to seize, or at least fix, the enemy entrenched there. Despite the 1.5:1 numerical superiority held by the Cape, the ridgeline was hammered by Arco aerial strikes as well as 81mm and 120mm mortars almost constantly. The 3rd Airborne Field Battery in its After-Action Report (AAR) reported that it had used almost 50% of its first-wave dropped ammunition stores on defensive positions on or supporting Hill 334 in the first 24 hours of fighting. | ||
By the end of the second day (H-Hour +48), the 4th Parachute Battalion held the majority of key terrain on Hill 334 and the Capetian forces ontop had either been destroyed or captured. As noted afterwards by the Commanding Officer of 4 Para, LCol Jeff Berskley, "The Capetians on [Hill] 334 fought with a tenacity that even we [4 Para] had to respect. It wasn't until afterwards we had learned they were Reservists that had only been called up for their annual service less than a week before. Despite the lives lost on both sides, even those who made it back left part of themselves in those hills." Nominal muster rolls on H-Hour +72 showed that Juliet, Kilo, and Lima companies had each fought to almost 50% strength, and amongst them Kilo Company specifically was on paper only at a total strength of 125 of 287 men, 44% total strength, of which the Officer Commanding (OC), was a junior Lieutenant, and three of its four platoons were under the command of NCOs, with only the weapons platoon still having an officer that had not been killed or wounded. After the battle, the | By the end of the second day (H-Hour +48), the 4th Parachute Battalion held the majority of key terrain on Hill 334 and the Capetian forces ontop had either been destroyed or captured. As noted afterwards by the Commanding Officer of 4 Para, LCol Jeff Berskley, "The Capetians on [Hill] 334 fought with a tenacity that even we [4 Para] had to respect. It wasn't until afterwards we had learned they were Reservists that had only been called up for their annual service less than a week before. Despite the lives lost on both sides, even those who made it back left part of themselves in those hills." Nominal muster rolls on H-Hour +72 showed that Juliet, Kilo, and Lima companies had each fought to almost 50% strength, and amongst them Kilo Company specifically was on paper only at a total strength of 125 of 287 men, 44% total strength, of which the Officer Commanding (OC), was a junior Lieutenant, and three of its four platoons were under the command of NCOs, with only the weapons platoon still having an officer that had not been killed or wounded. After the battle, the a section commander with 4 Para, Corporal Jeffery Yule, wrote in his memoir, "I saw men shot, men blown up until their guts spilled out like a dog under a car, and men bleed to death screaming for their mothers and fathers in a home they would never see again. But time again, the Sergeants and Warrants would stalk up and down the company lines, standing proud in a withering hail of [Capetian] machine-gun fire, bringing us spirit. I remember sitting in a shell crater with LCpl Cochrane, and he produced a flask of gin. He held it to his lips, taking a sip. We had surrendered our water to the Company's Aid Station to give some comfort to the wounded men. He leaned over, the whistling of mortar rounds howling overhead in the twilight of another day fighting. I took it with thanks, and that small sip gave me some courage that the day was not yet lost. He was killed less than an hour later, shot through the face by a Capetian machinegun. An only child of a Northlea farming family." | ||
Eddis, learning of the horrific fighting himself later concluded that he should have assigned more indirect fire assets for DZ Bravo, and in his own memoirs after the war wrote that the actions on Hill 334 were still some of his greatest regrets. | Eddis, learning of the horrific fighting himself later concluded that he should have assigned more indirect fire assets for DZ Bravo, and in his own memoirs after the war wrote that the actions on Hill 334 were still some of his greatest regrets. | ||