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History of Urcea (1902-1955): Difference between revisions
History of Urcea (1902-1955) (view source)
Revision as of 10:48, 15 February 2023
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During the [['97 Rising]], forces on both sides were still largely using mid-19th century artillery pieces, and no pieces with {{wp|Hydraulic recoil mechanism|hydro-pneumatic short recoil systems}} would enter standard usage until after the Rising. Accordingly, the interwar Royal and Imperial Army had almost no experience with modern warfare centered around heavy artillery and had to relearn tactics and basic military engineering from foreign experts. Since the last military experience had lacked the heavy artillery that lead to trench warfare, the Royal and Imperial Army had almost no experience with armor to speak of as of 1920 and no armored vehicles in service. Urcea began to license early tanks from [[Burgundie]] beginning in [[1922]], but many of these were already antiquated by the time a large number had been amassed, making them largely only suitable for training and doctrinal developments. | During the [['97 Rising]], forces on both sides were still largely using mid-19th century artillery pieces, and no pieces with {{wp|Hydraulic recoil mechanism|hydro-pneumatic short recoil systems}} would enter standard usage until after the Rising. Accordingly, the interwar Royal and Imperial Army had almost no experience with modern warfare centered around heavy artillery and had to relearn tactics and basic military engineering from foreign experts. Since the last military experience had lacked the heavy artillery that lead to trench warfare, the Royal and Imperial Army had almost no experience with armor to speak of as of 1920 and no armored vehicles in service. Urcea began to license early tanks from [[Burgundie]] beginning in [[1922]], but many of these were already antiquated by the time a large number had been amassed, making them largely only suitable for training and doctrinal developments. | ||
===Yonderian revolution=== | ===Yonderian revolution=== | ||
By [[1923]], it was clear to the new experts of the Imperial War College that the Royal and Imperial Army was, in the words of Yonderian general [[Benno de Caryale]], "totally unsuited for modern warfare...completely unable to implement or execute combined arms tactics",<ref>de Caryale, Benno: ''The Royal and Imperial Army: From Brick to Marble'', [[Gabion University]], pg. 5 + 15-19. 1959</ref> not only including the various armored forces but incorporating any element of the [[Royal Air Force (Urcea)|Royal Air Fleet]] in either a combat or logistics capacity. Between 1923 and 1926, from his position at the War College, [[Benno de Caryale]] gained increasing influence and authority over the armed forces, competing with and eventually surpassing the other foreign experts brought in to help revitalize the army. Initially, de Caryale held inlfuence in an unofficial capacity, finally receiving official authority in [[1926]]. Being named "[[Ministry of the Armed Services (Urcea)|Deputy Lord Marshal]] for the Renovation of His Most Christian Majesty's Forces", [[Benno de Caryale]] would institute major reforms and implement doctrinal changes between 1926 and 1930, when he returned to [[Yonderre]]. For his role in this effort, de Caryale has sometimes been called the "father of the modern Royal and Imperial Army." Many historians have noted that the lasting Yonderian influence on the Urcean armed forces likely played a major role in Urcea's support for [[Yonderre]] joining the [[Levantine Union]] following the upcoming [[Second Great War]]. | By [[1923]], it was clear to the new experts of the Imperial War College that the Royal and Imperial Army was, in the words of Yonderian general [[Benno de Caryale]], "totally unsuited for modern warfare...completely unable to implement or execute combined arms tactics",<ref>de Caryale, Benno: ''The Royal and Imperial Army: From Brick to Marble'', [[Gabion University]], pg. 5 + 15-19. 1959</ref> not only including the various armored forces but incorporating any element of the [[Royal Air Force (Urcea)|Royal Air Fleet]] in either a combat or logistics capacity. Between 1923 and 1926, from his position at the War College, [[Benno de Caryale]] gained increasing influence and authority over the armed forces, competing with and eventually surpassing the other foreign experts brought in to help revitalize the army. Initially, de Caryale held inlfuence in an unofficial capacity, finally receiving official authority in [[1926]]. Being named "[[Ministry of the Armed Services (Urcea)|Deputy Lord Marshal]] for the Renovation of His Most Christian Majesty's Forces", [[Benno de Caryale]] would institute major reforms and implement doctrinal changes between 1926 and 1930, when he returned to [[Yonderre]]. For his role in this effort, de Caryale has sometimes been called the "father of the modern Royal and Imperial Army." Many historians have noted that the lasting Yonderian influence on the Urcean armed forces likely played a major role in Urcea's support for [[Yonderre]] joining the [[Levantine Union]] following the upcoming [[Second Great War]]. Following Urcean victory in the Second Great War, de Caryale was conferred the honor of Imperial Knight in the [[Imperial Order of the Holy Cross]] in 1944 in recognition of his important contributions to Urcea. | ||
Under de Caryale's supervision, the Army specifically and military generally not only took on younger officers, but underwent several major field exercises in a variety of terrains including in [[Northgate]] in [[1926]] (with 150,000 participants), [[Afoncord]] (200,000 participants) and [[Callan]] (225,000 participants) in [[1927]], and major amphibious style exercises at [[Halfway]] and [[Talionia]] in [[1928]]. The Royal and Imperial Army performed very poorly in the Northgate exercises, leading to significant press and political pressure for improvements to the Army, although a minority believed that the "foreign" influence of de Caryale was creating unrealistic or incorrect performance standards. | Under de Caryale's supervision, the Army specifically and military generally not only took on younger officers, but underwent several major field exercises in a variety of terrains including in [[Northgate]] in [[1926]] (with 150,000 participants), [[Afoncord]] (200,000 participants) and [[Callan]] (225,000 participants) in [[1927]], and major amphibious style exercises at [[Halfway]] and [[Talionia]] in [[1928]]. The Royal and Imperial Army performed very poorly in the Northgate exercises, leading to significant press and political pressure for improvements to the Army, although a minority believed that the "foreign" influence of de Caryale was creating unrealistic or incorrect performance standards. | ||