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National Reconstruction Front (Daxia): Difference between revisions
National Reconstruction Front (Daxia) (view source)
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During this formative period the party embraced nationalism(it did not shy away from traditional Daxian chauvinism), center-left dirigist economic policies and supported the formation of social welfare programs. The latter two aspects helped it take the wind out of the sails of the [[Communist Party of Daxia|CPD]]'s support, who the NRF saw as its most dangerous opponent. Its dirigist and strong handed economic policies served well to steer the slowing Daxian economy back to growth and deal with the entrenched plutocratic interests that had become a holdover from the Qian system of patronage. Henceforth the economic powers would be subordinated to the political authority of the center and those that resisted this process would be pushed aside, their assets taken away and cannibalized by other actors. One aspect that is very criticized of [[Qiu Heng]]'s economic handling is his decision not to decisively curtail the involvement of the military on economic activity. He allowed the army and figures linked to it to handle a number of lucrative companies, one such being the construction behemoth of the [[North Crona Production and Construction Corporation]], much corruption was derived from these activities and would grow to become an issue that would cost the party much support. | During this formative period the party embraced nationalism(it did not shy away from traditional Daxian chauvinism), center-left dirigist economic policies and supported the formation of social welfare programs. The latter two aspects helped it take the wind out of the sails of the [[Communist Party of Daxia|CPD]]'s support, who the NRF saw as its most dangerous opponent. Its dirigist and strong handed economic policies served well to steer the slowing Daxian economy back to growth and deal with the entrenched plutocratic interests that had become a holdover from the Qian system of patronage. Henceforth the economic powers would be subordinated to the political authority of the center and those that resisted this process would be pushed aside, their assets taken away and cannibalized by other actors. One aspect that is very criticized of [[Qiu Heng]]'s economic handling is his decision not to decisively curtail the involvement of the military on economic activity. He allowed the army and figures linked to it to handle a number of lucrative companies, one such being the construction behemoth of the [[North Crona Production and Construction Corporation]], much corruption was derived from these activities and would grow to become an issue that would cost the party much support. | ||
Internally the party under [[Qiu Heng]] did not show many signs of institutional maturation, its internal party laws and processes were an afterthought, there were no regular party congresses or meetings to discuss policy or ideological subjects. [[Qiu Heng]] seemed to regard it as merely an electoral tool and he was not interested in it being anything more. This attitude began to change during his third term of office when his health began to fail him, the issue of succession began to be a topic of special consideration and the party would be needed to make the an eventual transition a smooth one. | Internally the party under [[Qiu Heng]] did not show many signs of institutional maturation, its internal party laws and processes were an afterthought, there were no regular party congresses or meetings to discuss policy or ideological subjects. [[Qiu Heng]] seemed to regard it as merely an electoral tool and he was not interested in it being anything more, he ran the government by himself with input from a closed clique. This attitude began to change during his third term of office when his health began to fail him, the issue of succession began to be a topic of special consideration and the party would be needed to make the an eventual transition a smooth one. The party finally got a working structure below the General Secretary, with a Politburo created and stacked with the president's loyalists from the bureaucracy and former military men; regional committees began to meet regularly and pick up the sentiments and opinions of the membership and transmit them to the center and the president began to meet with the Politburo on a monthly basis. The president's preferrence on possible successors is not recorded, his former minister of defense Yuga Khan wrote in his memoirs that the president mentioned wanting a civilian to succeed him during casual conversation but that no names were said. | ||
===Chi Long Qua era=== | ===Chi Long Qua era=== | ||
===Min Bib Doda era=== | ===Min Bib Doda era=== | ||