Weapons of mass destruction and Kiravia
| Kiravia | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Nuclear program start date | 21116 (Kiravian Union) 21124 (Rump Republic) |
| First nuclear weapon test | 21122 (KU) 21129 (KFR) |
| Last nuclear test | Last week, bitch |
| Total tests | Unknown |
As a major military power, the Kiravian Federacy openly possesses nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and weapon delivery systems, and continues to actively conduct research and development in all three weapons classes.
Nuclear Weapons
The Federacy currently claims to possess 2,420 nuclear warheads, with between 1,000 and 1,200 active at any given time. While it is generally agreed that the Kiravian nuclear arsenal is larger than disclosed, estimates as to how much the actual count differs from the official one range from as low as 300 to as high as 2,000.
The Federacy is able to deploy these warheads through the nuclear triad of long-range strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, giving it a credible second-strike capability.
Nuclear Programme History
Two nuclear programmes proceeded in parallel in the Kiravian Union (from 21116) and the rump Kiravian Federal Republic (from 21124), as part of a broader worldwide process of nuclear proliferation. The Kiravian Union's programme was undertaken to provide a deterrent against invasion by capitalist powers, while the KFR programme had dual goals of deterring against a hypothetical amphibious invasion of Æonara, Atrassica, or Porfíria by the Kiravian Union, as well as aiding in Template:Project National Glory.
Nuclear Doctrine
Kiravian nuclear doctrine has always been reactive and focused on self-preservation. Prime Executive Kexarin Rénkédar, under whose tenure the Federacy solidified its second-strike capability, grimly described the effort as “[O]ur hypothetical last stand. It exists to ensure that if Kiravia and the enemy devastate each other beyond recognition in a nuclear holocaust, there will be a handful of Kiravians left standing and zero enemy nationals.” His successor, Irasur Mérovin, echoed this sentiment, saying “Nuclear issues are existential issues. By obtaining nuclear arms, we have definitively secured our island continent against invasion. If we ever deploy them, it will be because we have no alternative, but make no mistake, if we discharge nuclear arms in combat, it will be, and must be, to annihilate the enemy.”
Under most circumstances, a nuclear strike requires the authorisation of the Prime Executive. However, certain nuclear missiles, such as those deployed on nuclear submarines, may be deployed on orders given from further down the chain of command. This is to enable the Federacy to carry out a second strike on the enemy following an initial nuclear exchange, during which the Prime Executive (and others in the order of succession) would likely be killed and the Federacy’s command-and-control infrastructure damaged.
The Prime Executive, Second Executive, Chief Defence Executive, Supreme General, Field General of the Strategic Missile Command, and Emergency Backup Executive are all accompanied by nuclear briefcases (Kiravic: Atomovilemuvya) when away from fixed command-and-control centres. According to a response to a press inquiry permitted by Prime Executive Rénkédar, the Prime Executive’s nuclear briefcase contains a booklet detailing the Federacy’s nuclear strike options and guidance on how to select one, a booklet describing continuity-of-government procedures and the locations of secure bunkers, a sealed envelope containing launch codes printed on a plastic card, unsigned letters delegating national command authority to others, instructions for activating emergency warning systems, a satellite phone, backup radio uplink, pens, a blank notepad, iodine pills, and a pair of sunglasses. According to former Chancellor Sārden Ēvūrverd, Prime Executive Kólsylvar once privately told him that the briefcase also contained a bottle of whiskey, two shot glasses, a pack of cigarettes and magnesium lighter, a watch, and a pack of pine-flavoured chewing gum. This report remains unconfirmed.
Chemical Weapons
The Kiravian Federacy maintains large stockpiles of chemical weapons and active chemical weapons research, manufacturing, and training programmes.
Kiravian forces deployed chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gas against enemy troops in [X War 21090s] and [Y War 21120s], and made limited use of nerve and blood agents in the Great Oceanic War. White phosphorous munitions were employed on numerous occasions for both incendiary and chemical effects between the 21100s and 21150s. The mainland Kiravian chemical weapons programme remained quite active between 21113 and 21153. Evidence has surfaced that the Kirosocialist government may have developed mechanisms for using a number of unusual (and extremely dangerous) compounds such as dimethylmercury, cyclopentadienyl nickel nitrosyl, methiocarb, dioxin, lysergic acid diethylamide, and various heavy metals and biotic toxins as weapons. Recent investigations have raised some suspicion that the Kirosocialist government may have undertaken some of this research with the aim of fielding chemical weapons against Kiravian civilians in the event of an uprising or civil war.
Chemical weapons research continued after Kirosocialism, with an emphasis on delivery methods and a focus on nerve, blood, and psychoactive agents. The manufacture of lethal compounds, however, was scaled back significantly, most likely due to the size of the stockpile already accumulated.
Chemical Weapons Doctrine
The standing Kiravian policy towards its chemical arsenal is to reserve it for defencive use. According to a 21205 Defence Executive memorandum: “The principal application envisioned for the Kiravian chemical arsenal is to deter against and, if necessary, decisively repel a ground invasion of the Home Islands, Æonara, Sydona, or another colonised landmass of commensurate size and strategic value.” According to the memorandum, chemical weapons fill potential “gaps” in the efficacy of a nuclear deterrent against a ground invasion engendered by the risk of mutually-assured destruction and other factors that might make civilian leadership hesitant to deploy nuclear weapons and therefore raise the probability of Kiravian commitment issues in the enemy’s calculations. Put more simply, whereas nuclear weapons carry the risk of inviting rapid retaliation in kind with massive, possibly existential consequences for the user if deployed, and therefore give the enemy reason to doubt Kiravian willingness to use them defencively, chemical weapons do not carry the same risks. Because they can be used as a tactical rather than strategic weapon, killing enemy troops in large numbers while causing significant psychological damage, chemical weapons can significantly reduce an invading power’s capacity and willingness to fight without precipitating a catastrophic nuclear exchange.
According to Prime Executive Andrus Candrin, “The Federacy has the capability to wage offencive chemical warfare if necessary, but we have determined that doing so would be both dangerous and militarily not worthwhile. The vast majority of our chemical arsenal is in long-term storage at a very low level of readiness. It would take some time to mobilise if ordered. I can say with confidence that only a handful of chemical weapons, if any, are ready for immediate deployment at any given time.” Independent observers and foreign intelligence agencies have disputed the veracity of this statement.
Authorisation from the Prime Executive is required for the initial retaliatory use of chemical weapons, after which the military chain of command may discharge them as necessary. A great deal of secrecy continues to surround the Kiravian chemical weapons programme, and doubts have been raised as to the accuracy of government-published information on the topic.
Suspected Deployment in the Yaviža Gap
Biological Weapons
The Kiravian Federacy acknowledges that it possesses weaponised biological agents and the means of deploying them, that it maintains ongoing research into biological warfare. Beyond this, negligible information about the Kiravian biological weapons programme has been disclosed by government sources, and spokesmen for the Defence and Security Executives have categorically refused to comment as to what agents the Federacy possesses or is researching, where research is taking place, and how or against whom such weapons might be used, except for assurances that any deployment would be in self-defence. Most available information has come from sporadic leaks.
Lassa fever, hantaviruses, diphtheria, tularaemia, Coccidioides immitis, entomological warfare, ebola (Bola Remix)
A number of unverified sources have claimed that the Federacy is investigating or may even possess prototypes of “ethnospecific” bioweapons effective only against specific populations, while others have speculated that Kiravian bioweapons research is more likely focused on agricultural targets.