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Kiravian Development Executive: Difference between revisions
Kiravian Development Executive (view source)
Revision as of 00:38, 25 September 2023
, 25 September 2023→Programmes and Agencies
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All provinces in the Inner Federation and South Kirav are eligible for Structural Adjustment funds. So too are the Melian Isles. Since the Pluricontinental Cohesion Act of 2010, provinces in the Overseas Regions which are integral territorial components of the Federacy are also eligible, but have smaller allocations and narrower project criteria. The SAF is funded out of the federal budget and (to a much lesser extent) returns on investments in for-profit ventures. Every year, each eligible province is allotted a share of SA funds using a formula based mainly on GDP per capita and Civil Development Index. This formula is meant to direct more funding toward the provinces where it is most needed. | All provinces in the Inner Federation and South Kirav are eligible for Structural Adjustment funds. So too are the Melian Isles. Since the Pluricontinental Cohesion Act of 2010, provinces in the Overseas Regions which are integral territorial components of the Federacy are also eligible, but have smaller allocations and narrower project criteria. The SAF is funded out of the federal budget and (to a much lesser extent) returns on investments in for-profit ventures. Every year, each eligible province is allotted a share of SA funds using a formula based mainly on GDP per capita and Civil Development Index. This formula is meant to direct more funding toward the provinces where it is most needed. | ||
SAF grants are administered by the federal Development Executive together with select provincial and subprovincial agencies known as Designated Management Authorities. A DMA is usually a province’s existing development ministry, a cantonal agency, or an intermunicipal body. In the standard process for first-instance applications, Designated Management Authorities receive grant applications and screen out ineligible or informal proposals. They then evaluate proposals on the merits and select which to send on to Kartika for further consideration by the Development Executive. DMAs have discretion in selecting which allowable applications are transmitted for federal review, though rejections at this level are audited and can be appealed to a federal Board of Interferences if impropriety is alleged. At the federal level, the Structural Adjustment Fund Administration’s Boards of Review further evaluate proposals and the concomitant reports from the DMAs. Boards of Review forward approved applications to region-specific Boards of Allowance, which may approve as many applications as a province’s fund allocation for new projects can accommodate. Boards of Review and Allowance make their selections based on the Blue Book, supplemented by memoranda issued by the Chief Development Executive expressing the current administration’s development strategy and priorities. The latter are particularly influential over the Boards of Allowance, which must choose how to distribute funds across competing functional areas. Accepted proposals result in a grant agreement which allows for the delivery of funds. Post-grant, both the DMA and the SAFA’s Office of Supervision receive reports from receiving organisations on the use of grant money and monitor the implementation of projects to ensure compliance with federal regulations and the grant agreement. | SAF grants are administered by the federal Development Executive together with select provincial and subprovincial agencies known as Designated Management Authorities. A DMA is usually a province’s existing development ministry, a cantonal agency, or an intermunicipal body. In the standard process for first-instance applications, Designated Management Authorities receive grant applications and screen out ineligible or informal proposals. They then evaluate proposals on the merits and select which to send on to Kartika for further consideration by the Development Executive. DMAs have discretion in selecting which allowable applications are transmitted for federal review, though rejections at this level are audited and can be appealed to a federal Board of Interferences if impropriety is alleged. At the federal level, the Structural Adjustment Fund Administration’s Boards of Review further evaluate proposals and the concomitant reports from the DMAs.<ref>Under the current organisational scheme, proposals are assigned to Boards of Review according to “development zone” and functional area. For example, a project to restore a waterfront esplanade in [[Cities of Kiravia#Kórveırak|Kórveırak]] would be assigned to Board 44 «Upper Kirav Municipal Improvements», and a project to stabilise slag heaps in the [[Darran Valley]] would be assigned to Board 65 «Reclamation».</ref> Boards of Review forward approved applications to region-specific Boards of Allowance, which may approve as many applications as a province’s fund allocation for new projects can accommodate.<ref>If a province’s allocation for new projects is not exhausted and adequate time remains, the SAFA may invite DMAs to forward additional applications. This may also occur if funds in a province’s total allocation are freed up by rejection of a proposal for a continuing project or a post-grant disqualification. Otherwise, the funds are credited toward the province’s allocation for the next fiscal year. Funds that go undistributed for two years are remitted to the Exchequer. As such, it is standard procedure for DMAs to have a “B-team” of applications on hand each year.</ref> Boards of Review and Allowance make their selections based on the Blue Book, supplemented by memoranda issued by the Chief Development Executive expressing the current administration’s development strategy and priorities. The latter are particularly influential over the Boards of Allowance, which must choose how to distribute funds across competing functional areas. Accepted proposals result in a grant agreement which allows for the delivery of funds. Post-grant, both the DMA and the SAFA’s Office of Supervision receive reports from receiving organisations on the use of grant money and monitor the implementation of projects to ensure compliance with federal regulations and the grant agreement. | ||
Long-term projects | Long-term projects seeking recurring funding must be declared as such in the initial proposal, and are governed by grant agreements fixing dates for periodic review by dedicated Boards of Review and setting parameters for any future funding adjustments. | ||
====Recipients==== | ====Recipients==== | ||
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Inherited from the Kiravian Union as the Interior Development Office, the IDO has been a political (if mostly rhetorical) lightning rod in the larger public debate about the policy significance of ethnic/caste/communal groups under liberalism. The [[Shaftonist Republican Alliance]], grounded in the ''[[Glossary_of_Coscivian_Terms#Dh|dhianbrikorisēn]]'' of the [[Renaissance Party]] and increasingly perceived in recent decades as representing higher caste interests, has often railed against the agency but has not moved to abolish the IDO despite its long-term political dominance. The [[Coscivian National Congress]], which has a strong voter base among the lower castes, has defended the IDO and its budget from SRA cuts even as a coalition partner. Customary leaders, Urom activists, traditionalist commentators, and some socialists have criticised the IDO's development philosophy and rating criteria as reflective of urban, bourgeois, and upper-caste biases and denigrating towards manual labour and traditional economies. | Inherited from the Kiravian Union as the Interior Development Office, the IDO has been a political (if mostly rhetorical) lightning rod in the larger public debate about the policy significance of ethnic/caste/communal groups under liberalism. The [[Shaftonist Republican Alliance]], grounded in the ''[[Glossary_of_Coscivian_Terms#Dh|dhianbrikorisēn]]'' of the [[Renaissance Party]] and increasingly perceived in recent decades as representing higher caste interests, has often railed against the agency but has not moved to abolish the IDO despite its long-term political dominance. The [[Coscivian National Congress]], which has a strong voter base among the lower castes, has defended the IDO and its budget from SRA cuts even as a coalition partner. Customary leaders, Urom activists, traditionalist commentators, and some socialists have criticised the IDO's development philosophy and rating criteria as reflective of urban, bourgeois, and upper-caste biases and denigrating towards manual labour and traditional economies. | ||
==Notes== | |||
[[Category:Collegiate executives]] | [[Category:Collegiate executives]] | ||
[[Category:Kiravia]] | [[Category:Kiravia]] | ||
[[Category:IXWB]] | [[Category:IXWB]] | ||