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Kiravian Development Executive: Difference between revisions
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==Programmes and Agencies== | ==Programmes and Agencies== | ||
===Structural Adjustment Fund=== | ===Structural Adjustment Fund=== | ||
The Structural Adjustment Fund is a Kiravian federal expenditure program that provides grants to support economic development, maintain nationwide social stability and cohesion, and reduce regional disparities in growth and standards of living. The SAF primarily benefits the poorer inland provinces of the Kiravian Mainland and depressed or transitional regions in more highly developed provinces; however, all regions of the Kiravian Federacy have access to structural funds subject to varying conditions. The SAF accounts for a majority of federal spending on domestic development aid. | |||
The Structural Adjustment Fund was established in 1993 to mitigate the negative economic and social consequences of Kiravian reunification and economic liberalisation of the Kiravian mainland. Some regions were better-positioned to benefit from the return of capitalism than others, and life in many parts of Kiravia was seriously disrupted by the industrial restructuring, foreign competition, and privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Much of the former Kiravian Remnant also experienced a pronounced economic downturn after reunification as the economic centre of gravity shifted back to the Mainland, drawing away investment and major employers. In this context, the Structural Adjustment Fund was designed with a “stronger whole from stronger parts” mindset as a way to provide a coördinated nationwide structural adjustment strategy capable of meeting varying needs across the Federacy’s diverse regions. At the time, it was touted as a more flexible, efficient and decentralised replacement for various Kiravian Union public works agencies and service corps. | |||
The SAF is governed by several Acts of the Stanora and Collegial Orders, as well as a host of administrative regulations. The Manual of Structural Adjustment Disbursement compends all laws, standards, and procedures relevant to the SAF in an accessible and well-indexed volume for easy reference by applicants and government staff. It is customarily referred to as the “Blue Book” by those in the field, though the cover of recent editions is actually {{wp|Heliotrope_(color)#Heliotrope_gray|heliotrope grey}}. | |||
All provinces in the Inner Federation and South Kirav are eligible for Structural Adjustment funds. So too are the Melian Isles. Since the Pluricontinental Cohesion Act of 2010, provinces in the Overseas Regions which are integral territorial components of the Federacy are also eligible, but have smaller allocations and narrower project criteria. The SAF is funded out of the federal budget and (to a much lesser extent) returns on investments in for-profit ventures. Every year, each eligible province is allotted a share of SA funds using a formula based mainly on GDP per capita and Civil Development Index. This formula is meant to direct more funding toward the provinces where it is most needed. | |||
SAF grants are administered by the federal Development Executive together with select provincial and subprovincial agencies known as Designated Management Authorities. A DMA is usually a province’s existing development ministry, a cantonal agency, or an intermunicipal body. In the standard process for first-instance applications, Designated Management Authorities receive grant applications and screen out ineligible or informal proposals. They then evaluate proposals on the merits and select which to send on to Kartika for further consideration by the Development Executive. DMAs have discretion in selecting which allowable applications are transmitted for federal review, though rejections at this level are audited and can be appealed to a federal Board of Interferences if impropriety is alleged. At the federal level, the Structural Adjustment Fund Administration’s Boards of Review further evaluate proposals and the concomitant reports from the DMAs. Boards of Review forward approved applications to region-specific Boards of Allowance, which may approve as many applications as a province’s fund allocation for new projects can accommodate. Boards of Review and Allowance make their selections based on the Blue Book, supplemented by memoranda issued by the Chief Development Executive expressing the current administration’s development strategy and priorities. The latter are particularly influential over the Boards of Allowance, which must choose how to distribute funds across competing functional areas. Accepted proposals result in a grant agreement which allows for the delivery of funds. Post-grant, both the DMA and the SAFA’s Office of Supervision receive reports from receiving organisations on the use of grant money and monitor the implementation of projects to ensure compliance with federal regulations and the grant agreement. | |||
Long-term projects requiring seeking recurring funding must be declared as such in the initial proposal, and are governed by grant agreements fixing dates for periodic review by dedicated Boards of Review and setting parameters for any future funding adjustments. | |||
====Recipients==== | |||
A diverse array of organisations receive grants from the Structural Adjustment Fund, ranging from humanitarian NGOs to research institutions to private businesses, local governments, museums, civic associations, rural coöperatives, fraternal organisations, startup incubators, provincial government agencies, and public-private partnerships. Funds cannot be granted to churches or equivalent institutions, but autonomous religiously-affiliated organisations are still eligible. | |||
====Criticism, Lobbying, and Corruption==== | |||
The SAF and its practices have been criticised from numerous angles. The Bérasar-based Institute for Social Entrepreneurship says that the lengthy and involved approval process limits access to SAF grants to larger organisations able to afford lobbyists and consultants to shepard their applications through the process, shutting out smaller, more grassroots organisations. Most in the development field do indeed regard the application process as labour-intensive and difficult to navigate without specialist knowledge, but as Kiravian federal bureaucracies go it is more efficient and forgiving than the immigrant visa approval process or the Kiravian Intellectual Property Office, which are quick to reject applications for minor informalities and demand heavy fines to keep them pending. | |||
The susceptibility of Implementation Management Authorities to partisan political influence has also been a source of complaints. Officially, even though IMAs are most often agencies of provincial or subprovincial governments led by political appointees, they are obligated to carry out their functions in the SAF evaluation process in accordance with federally-established program objectives and guidelines rather than the policy priorities of their regional government. In practice, this provision is routinely violated and has proven difficult to enforce. | |||
Since the Fund was established in 1993, 28 officials have been indicted for public corruption related to the SAF, of which six have been convicted. | |||
===Sanitation Improvement Agency=== | ===Sanitation Improvement Agency=== | ||