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→Arcerion order of Battle
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The leadership of Rear Admiral Lawrence Arthur Coxley, who was acting as Commander, Submarine Force, at the outbreak of the war would also prove pivotal as the emphasis on submerged operations (as most submarines of the period sailed on the surface) as well as the principles of mission command and reduced reliance on regular High-Frequency (HF) communications ensured that the Arcer submarine forces could remain at sea longer and patrol greater distances regardless of the logistical strain it was incurring at home. | The leadership of Rear Admiral Lawrence Arthur Coxley, who was acting as Commander, Submarine Force, at the outbreak of the war would also prove pivotal as the emphasis on submerged operations (as most submarines of the period sailed on the surface) as well as the principles of mission command and reduced reliance on regular High-Frequency (HF) communications ensured that the Arcer submarine forces could remain at sea longer and patrol greater distances regardless of the logistical strain it was incurring at home. | ||
<nowiki>**</nowiki>REPLACE WITH GRAPHIC ORG CHART** | |||
==== Arcerion order of Battle ==== | ==== Arcerion order of Battle ==== | ||
{{flagicon|Arcerion}} '''Royal Arcerion Submarine Service''', Rear Admiral Lawrence Arthur Coxley (His Majesty's Arcer Naval Station Chester-on-Moore, Arcerion) | {{flagicon|Arcerion}} '''Royal Arcerion Submarine Service''', Rear Admiral Lawrence Arthur Coxley (His Majesty's Arcer Naval Station Chester-on-Moore, Arcerion) | ||
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Coxley's major concern was the resupply of Submarine Group 2, as they were far afield from the ability for the six submarine tenders to resupply. Coxley sent a letter to the admiralty to engage with the Burgoignesc Defense Attache at the Burgoignesc Embassy of Arcerion, and arrange for a joint agreement wherein Arcer submarines could be resupplied, fuelled, and rearmed from Burgoignesc vessels based out of [[Equitorial Ostiecia|Equatorial Ostiecia]]. Arcerion would send necessary provisions that were specific to Arcerion's submarines such as mines, torpedoes, and other supplies via rail to the New Archduchy, and from there escorted via convoy to Ostiecia wherein they could be loaded onto their Burgoignesc counterparts' own submarine tenders until such a time as Arcerion could find a way to get several of their own there and based effectively with sufficient escorting surface vessels. | Coxley's major concern was the resupply of Submarine Group 2, as they were far afield from the ability for the six submarine tenders to resupply. Coxley sent a letter to the admiralty to engage with the Burgoignesc Defense Attache at the Burgoignesc Embassy of Arcerion, and arrange for a joint agreement wherein Arcer submarines could be resupplied, fuelled, and rearmed from Burgoignesc vessels based out of [[Equitorial Ostiecia|Equatorial Ostiecia]]. Arcerion would send necessary provisions that were specific to Arcerion's submarines such as mines, torpedoes, and other supplies via rail to the New Archduchy, and from there escorted via convoy to Ostiecia wherein they could be loaded onto their Burgoignesc counterparts' own submarine tenders until such a time as Arcerion could find a way to get several of their own there and based effectively with sufficient escorting surface vessels. | ||
The first engagement took place in the first of May. HMAS Loyal, on patrol for its second week in Operations Zone 2, encountered a trio of Capetian merchantmen sailing Southwards from the Capetian Islands to Cape Town, carrying supplies for their war effort. Engaging with one torpedo each, two of the vessels were sunk in short order and lost with all hands, the third being immobilized and sunk by the HMAS Loyal's deck gun with the vessel's crew taking to lifeboats. Upon reaching a safe distance from the engagement, the Loyal's Commanding Officer, Captain Ronald John Merchant signaled via HF radio to Port Hughes, "''Loyal destroyed three ships Zone 2 STOP For King and Country STOP.''" The original transcript message from the HF teletype machine would later be framed and placed in the Royal Arcerion War Museum. | The first engagement took place in the first of May. HMAS Loyal, on patrol for its second week in Operations Zone 2, encountered a trio of Capetian merchantmen sailing Southwards from the Capetian Islands to Cape Town, carrying supplies for their war effort. Engaging with one torpedo each, two of the vessels were sunk in short order and lost with all hands, the third being immobilized and sunk by the HMAS Loyal's deck gun with the vessel's crew taking to lifeboats. Upon reaching a safe distance from the engagement, the Loyal's Commanding Officer, Captain Ronald John Merchant signaled via HF radio to Port Hughes, "''Loyal destroyed three ships Zone 2 STOP For King and Country STOP.''" The original transcript message from the HF teletype machine would later be framed and placed in the Royal Arcerion War Museum. | ||
The Arcer submarines would continue to destroy dozens of Capetian vessels in the Songun Sea until the end of 1934, but Submarine Group 2 was having much less success in their zones outside of the Songun. Issues with long-range communications (limited to the extreme edge of Zone 2) meant that orders were sparsely given and Captains often could not rely on the scouting and intelligence reports from the Arcer Admiralty as cues on where to go to hunt and patrol like their green-water Group 1 counterparts. Frustrations continued to mount, as by the end of 1934 only a dozen Capetian ships had been sunk in any of Zones three, four or five. The Commander of Group 2 was relieved and replaced by Commodore Reginald T. Yves, an aggressive former submariner who was transferred out of the Raiding Force, where he relinquished command of the Frigate ''Shark'' for this new position. Yves set out the operational plan for 1935 to emphasize squadron-level raiding. He assigned Squadron 3 as as screening and scouting force, with Squadron 4 to serve as the raiding force to engage Capetian ships. He placed a set of rules, wherein Squadron 3 would patrol Zone 3 off the coast of Cape Town, and submarines would split off and follow groupings of ships, reporting their position to Squadron 4, who would assign submarines to go and engage. In this instance, Yves was generating his own operational intelligence. As well, Yves petitioned the Admiralty for a new HF transmissions ship to be outfitted and sent to operate in the Polynesian, to allow for Squadrons 3 and 4 to be more disparate and decentralized to more effectively cover Zones Four and Five. | The Arcer submarines would continue to destroy dozens of Capetian vessels in the Songun Sea until the end of 1934, but Submarine Group 2 was having much less success in their zones outside of the Songun. Issues with long-range communications (limited to the extreme edge of Zone 2) meant that orders were sparsely given and Captains often could not rely on the scouting and intelligence reports from the Arcer Admiralty as cues on where to go to hunt and patrol like their green-water Group 1 counterparts. Frustrations continued to mount, as by the end of 1934 only a dozen Capetian ships had been sunk in any of Zones three, four or five. The Commander of Group 2 was relieved and replaced by Commodore Reginald T. Yves, an aggressive former submariner who was transferred out of the Raiding Force, where he relinquished command of the Frigate ''Shark'' for this new position. Yves set out the operational plan for 1935 to emphasize squadron-level raiding. He assigned Squadron 3 as as screening and scouting force, with Squadron 4 to serve as the raiding force to engage Capetian ships. He placed a set of rules, wherein Squadron 3 would patrol Zone 3 off the coast of Cape Town, and submarines would split off and follow groupings of ships, reporting their position to Squadron 4, who would assign submarines to go and engage. In this instance, Yves was generating his own operational intelligence. As well, Yves petitioned the Admiralty for a new HF transmissions ship to be outfitted and sent to operate in the Polynesian, to allow for Squadrons 3 and 4 to be more disparate and decentralized to more effectively cover Zones Four and Five. | ||
[[File:Capetian Freighter Burning.jpg|thumb|A Capetian Freighter is photographed from a Capetian Patrol aircraft shortly after being struck by an Arcer torpedo off the Southern coast of [[Æonara]], 1936.]] | [[File:Capetian Freighter Burning.jpg|thumb|A Capetian Freighter is photographed from a Capetian Patrol aircraft shortly after being struck by an Arcer torpedo off the Southern coast of [[Æonara]], 1936.]] | ||
The results for Yves in 1935 were astounding, as by June 1st of 1935 over one hundred Capetian merchantmen and commercial freighters flagged as Capetian were sunk. The new method meant that the Cape was forced to create larger, slower convoys to maximize the amount of ships it could protect with its limited escort force, whilst the submarines of Group 2 slowly continued to sink them at an ever increasing pace. | The results for Yves in 1935 were astounding, as by June 1st of 1935 over one hundred Capetian merchantmen and commercial freighters flagged as Capetian were sunk. The new method meant that the Cape was forced to create larger, slower convoys to maximize the amount of ships it could protect with its limited escort force, whilst the submarines of Group 2 slowly continued to sink them at an ever increasing pace. | ||
With the introduction of the HMAS Mercury, an HF transmissions and command ship that could sail in the Polynesian and bridge the gap between Group 2's patrol and raiding craft, the Arcer submarines would continue to mount losses against Capetian vessels for the remainder of 1936-1938, with the tonnage lost by the Capetian merchant marine and civilian freight companies began to outpace the ability of the existing fleet to sail or replace vessels with new ship laying. | With the introduction of the HMAS Mercury, an HF transmissions and command ship that could sail in the Polynesian and bridge the gap between Group 2's patrol and raiding craft, the Arcer submarines would continue to mount losses against Capetian vessels for the remainder of 1936-1938, with the tonnage lost by the Capetian merchant marine and civilian freight companies began to outpace the ability of the existing fleet to sail or replace vessels with new ship laying. | ||
=== Mid War (1938-1941) === | === Mid War (1938-1941) === | ||