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Operation Flyhook: Difference between revisions
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The first engagement took place in the first of May. HMAS Loyal, on patrol for its second week in Operations Zone 2, encountered a trio of Capetian merchantmen sailing Southwards from the Capetian Islands to Cape Town, carrying supplies for their war effort. Engaging with one torpedo each, two of the vessels were sunk in short order and lost with all hands, the third being immobilized and sunk by the HMAS Loyal's deck gun with the vessel's crew taking to lifeboats. Upon reaching a safe distance from the engagement, the Loyal's Commanding Officer, Captain Ronald John Merchant signaled via HF radio to Port Hughes, "''Loyal destroyed three ships Zone 2 STOP For King and Country STOP.''" The original transcript message from the HF teletype machine would later be framed and placed in the Royal Arcerion War Museum. | The first engagement took place in the first of May. HMAS Loyal, on patrol for its second week in Operations Zone 2, encountered a trio of Capetian merchantmen sailing Southwards from the Capetian Islands to Cape Town, carrying supplies for their war effort. Engaging with one torpedo each, two of the vessels were sunk in short order and lost with all hands, the third being immobilized and sunk by the HMAS Loyal's deck gun with the vessel's crew taking to lifeboats. Upon reaching a safe distance from the engagement, the Loyal's Commanding Officer, Captain Ronald John Merchant signaled via HF radio to Port Hughes, "''Loyal destroyed three ships Zone 2 STOP For King and Country STOP.''" The original transcript message from the HF teletype machine would later be framed and placed in the Royal Arcerion War Museum. | ||
The Arcer submarines would continue to destroy dozens of Capetian vessels in the Songun Sea until the end of 1934, but Submarine Group 2 was having much less success in their zones outside of the Songun. Issues with long-range communications (limited to the extreme edge of Zone 2) meant that orders were sparsely given and Captains often could not rely on the scouting and intelligence reports from the Arcer Admiralty as cues on where to go to hunt and patrol like their green-water Group 1 counterparts. Frustrations continued to mount, as by the end of 1934 only a dozen Capetian ships had been sunk in any of Zones three, four or five. The Commander of Group 2 was relieved and replaced by Commodore Reginald T. Yves, an aggressive former submariner who was transferred out of the Raiding Force, where he relinquished command of the Frigate ''Shark'' for this new position. Yves set out the operational plan for 1935 to emphasize squadron-level raiding. He assigned Squadron 3 as as screening and scouting force, with Squadron 4 to serve as the raiding force to engage Capetian ships. He placed a set of rules, wherein Squadron 3 would patrol Zone 3 off the coast of Cape Town, and submarines would split off and follow groupings of ships, reporting their position to Squadron 4, who would assign submarines to go and engage. In this instance, Yves was generating his own operational intelligence. As well, Yves petitioned the Admiralty for a new HF transmissions ship to be outfitted and sent to operate in the Polynesian, to allow for Squadrons 3 and 4 to be more disparate and decentralized to more effectively cover Zones Four and Five. | The Arcer submarines would continue to destroy dozens of Capetian vessels in the Songun Sea until the end of 1934, but Submarine Group 2 was having much less success in their zones outside of the Songun. Issues with long-range communications (limited to the extreme edge of Zone 2) meant that orders were sparsely given and Captains often could not rely on the scouting and intelligence reports from the Arcer Admiralty as cues on where to go to hunt and patrol like their green-water Group 1 counterparts. Frustrations continued to mount, as by the end of 1934 only a dozen Capetian ships had been sunk in any of Zones three, four or five. The Commander of Group 2 was relieved and replaced by Commodore Reginald T. Yves, an aggressive former submariner who was transferred out of the Raiding Force, where he relinquished command of the Frigate ''Shark'' for this new position. Yves set out the operational plan for 1935 to emphasize squadron-level raiding. He assigned Squadron 3 as as screening and scouting force, with Squadron 4 to serve as the raiding force to engage Capetian ships. He placed a set of rules, wherein Squadron 3 would patrol Zone 3 off the coast of Cape Town, and submarines would split off and follow groupings of ships, reporting their position to Squadron 4, who would assign submarines to go and engage. In this instance, Yves was generating his own operational intelligence. As well, Yves petitioned the Admiralty for a new HF transmissions ship to be outfitted and sent to operate in the Polynesian, to allow for Squadrons 3 and 4 to be more disparate and decentralized to more effectively cover Zones Four and Five. | ||
[[File:Capetian Freighter Burning.jpg|thumb|A Capetian Freighter is photographed from a Capetian Patrol aircraft shortly after being struck by an Arcer torpedo off the Southern coast of [[Æonara]], 1936.]] | |||
The results for Yves in 1935 were astounding, as by June 1st of 1935 over one hundred Capetian merchantmen and commercial freighters flagged as Capetian were sunk. The new method meant that the Cape was forced to create larger, slower convoys to maximize the amount of ships it could protect with its limited escort force, whilst the submarines of Group 2 slowly continued to sink them at an ever increasing pace. | The results for Yves in 1935 were astounding, as by June 1st of 1935 over one hundred Capetian merchantmen and commercial freighters flagged as Capetian were sunk. The new method meant that the Cape was forced to create larger, slower convoys to maximize the amount of ships it could protect with its limited escort force, whilst the submarines of Group 2 slowly continued to sink them at an ever increasing pace. | ||
With the introduction of the HMAS Mercury, an HF transmissions and command ship that could sail in the Polynesian and bridge the gap between Group 2's patrol and raiding craft, the Arcer submarines would continue to mount losses against Capetian vessels for the remainder of 1936-1938, with the tonnage lost by the Capetian merchant marine and civilian freight companies began to outpace the ability of the existing fleet to sail or replace vessels with new ship laying. | |||
With the introduction of the HMAS Mercury, an HF transmissions and command ship that could sail in the Polynesian and bridge the gap between Group 2's patrol and raiding craft, the Arcer submarines would continue to mount losses against Capetian vessels for the remainder of 1936-1938, with the tonnage lost by the Capetian merchant marine and civilian freight companies began to outpace the ability of the existing fleet to sail or replace vessels with new ship laying. | |||
=== Mid War (1938-1941) === | === Mid War (1938-1941) === | ||
=== Late War (1940-1943) === | === Late War (1940-1943) === | ||