Weapons of mass destruction and Kiravia: Difference between revisions

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===Chemical Weapons Doctrine===
===Chemical Weapons Doctrine===
The standing Kiravian policy towards its chemical arsenal is to reserve it for defencive use. According to a 21205 Defence Executive memorandum: “The principal application envisioned for the Kiravian chemical arsenal is to deter against and, if necessary, decisively repel a ground invasion of the Home Islands, Æonara, Sydona, or another colonised landmass of commensurate size and strategic value.” According to the memorandum, chemical weapons fill potential “gaps” in the efficacy of a nuclear deterrent against a ground invasion engendered by the risk of mutually-assured destruction and other factors that might make civilian leadership hesitant to deploy nuclear weapons and therefore raise the probability of Kiravian {{wp|commitment issues}} in the enemy’s calculations. Put more simply, whereas nuclear weapons carry the risk of inviting rapid retaliation in kind with massive, possibly existential consequences for the user if deployed, and therefore give the enemy reason to doubt Kiravian willingness to use them defencively, chemical weapons do not carry the same risks. Because they can be used as a tactical rather than strategic weapon, killing enemy troops in large numbers while causing significant psychological damage, chemical weapons can significantly reduce an invading power’s capacity and willingness to fight without precipitating a catastrophic nuclear exchange.
The standing Kiravian policy towards its chemical arsenal is to reserve it for defencive use. According to a 21205 Defence Executive memorandum: “The principal application envisioned for the Kiravian chemical arsenal is to deter against and, if necessary, decisively repel a ground invasion of the Home Islands, Æonara, Dysona, or another colonised landmass of commensurate size and strategic value.” According to the memorandum, chemical weapons fill potential “gaps” in the efficacy of a nuclear deterrent against a ground invasion engendered by the risk of mutually-assured destruction and other factors that might make civilian leadership hesitant to deploy nuclear weapons and therefore raise the probability of Kiravian {{wp|commitment issues}} in the enemy’s calculations. Put more simply, whereas nuclear weapons carry the risk of inviting rapid retaliation in kind with massive, possibly existential consequences for the user if deployed, and therefore give the enemy reason to doubt Kiravian willingness to use them defencively, chemical weapons do not carry the same risks. Because they can be used as a tactical rather than strategic weapon, killing enemy troops in large numbers while causing significant psychological damage, chemical weapons can significantly reduce an invading power’s capacity and willingness to fight without precipitating a catastrophic nuclear exchange.


According to Prime Executive Andrus Candrin, “The Federacy has the capability to wage offencive chemical warfare if necessary, but we have determined that doing so would be both dangerous and militarily not worthwhile. The vast majority of our chemical arsenal is in long-term storage at a very low level of readiness. It would take some time to mobilise if ordered. I can say with confidence that only a handful of chemical weapons, if any, are ready for immediate deployment at any given time.” Independent observers and foreign intelligence agencies have disputed the veracity of this statement.
According to Prime Executive Andrus Candrin, “The Federacy has the capability to wage offencive chemical warfare if necessary, but we have determined that doing so would be both dangerous and militarily not worthwhile. The vast majority of our chemical arsenal is in long-term storage at a very low level of readiness. It would take some time to mobilise if ordered. I can say with confidence that only a handful of chemical weapons, if any, are ready for immediate deployment at any given time.” Independent observers and foreign intelligence agencies have disputed the veracity of this statement.

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